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Rapid population growth in 
many metropolitan areas in the United 
States has made them economically 
viable locations for professional sports 
franchises such as those of Major 
League Baseball (MLB) or the Nation-
al Football League (NFL). But since all 
four of the major sports leagues tightly 
control both the creation of new 
franchises and the relocation of teams, 
cities’ demand for teams far exceeds 
the supply.1
re the large public expenditures on new
stadiums a good investment for cities? Does 
hosting a major sports team have benefits?
Although public subsidies for professional 
sports teams are controversial, the answer to these 
questions may well be yes. In this article, Jerry Carlino 
and Ed Coulson report the results of their 2003 study: 
When quality-of-life benefits are included in the calcula-
tion, building new stadiums and hosting an NFL franchise 
may indeed be a good deal for cities and their residents.
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1 The other major sports leagues are the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL) and the National 
Basketball Association (NBA).
As a result, the price cities 
have to pay to get teams has gone up. 
Cities have offered favorable stadium 
deals in their efforts to retain or attract 
teams. Partly as a result of this fierce 
competition for teams, “America is in 
the midst of a sports stadium construc-
tion boom,” as noted by Roger Noll 
and Andrew Zimbalist. Professional 
sports teams are demanding — and 
receiving — subsidies from local 
governments for the construction or 
restoration of sports stadiums. Accord-
ing to Raymond Keating, the total cost 
of 29 sports facilities that opened be-
tween 1999 and 2003 is expected to be 
around $9 billion. Keating found that 
taxpayers’ money financed around $5.7 
billion, or 64 percent, of this $9 billion. 
The boom in stadium con-
struction coupled with the increased 
public support for these facilities raises 
the question: “Are subsidies to sports 
teams a good investment for cities?”  
The answer has been controversial.
Often, subsidies are justified 
by claims that attracting or retaining 
sports teams more than pays for itself 
in increased local tax revenue by creat-
ing new jobs and more spending. More 
recently, local officials have come to 
view a downtown stadium project as 
an important part of the revitalization 
of the central city’s urban core. Advo-
cates of this approach point to Jacobs 
Field in Cleveland, Coors Field in Den-
ver, and Camden Yards in Baltimore as 
models of how stadium-based develop-
ment can work.  However, independent 
studies by economists often indicate 
that taxpayers may not be getting such 
a good deal.  Most studies that have 
attempted to quantify the creation of 
jobs, income, and tax revenue have 
found that the direct monetary impact 
felt by a city hosting a sports team is 
less than the sizable outlay of public 
funds. Yet civic leaders continue to 
make the case for professional sports 
and the beneficial role they play in the 
community. 
Recently, economists have 
pointed out that previous studies 
missed a basic point: Professional 
sports teams add to residents’ qual-
ity of life in cities that host teams. It’s 
possible that people obtain benefits 
from having a local sports team even 
if they never go to a game. They root 8   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   9 www.phil.frb.org
for the local athletes, look forward to 
reading about their success or failure in 
the newspaper, and share in the city-
wide joy when the home team wins a 
championship.  
Economists have long studied 
the effects of an area’s quality of life 
on wages and the cost of housing. 
Past studies have found that people 
are willing to pay indirectly for local 
amenities, such as good weather, scenic 
views, and nearness to the ocean, in 
the form of higher rents and lower 
wages. Similarly, if people benefit 
from having a professional sports 
franchise in their community, they are 
presumably willing to pay for it — if 
not directly through the purchase of 
tickets, then indirectly through an 
increased willingness both to pay more 
for housing in the area and to accept 
lower wages.
We did a study in 2003 in 
which we looked at the quality-of-life 
benefits residents receive in cities 
that host an NFL team. We found 
that once quality-of-life benefits are 
included in the calculus, the seemingly 
large public expenditure on new stadi-
ums appears to be a good investment 
for cities and their residents.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF SPORTS FRANCHISES
Professional sports teams 
play in facilities heavily subsidized by 
local governments. Typically, cities use 
general revenue bonds to finance their 
share of the cost of a stadium. These 
bonds are paid off through a variety of 
sources, for example, ticket surcharges, 
taxes on hotel rooms and car rent-
als, and state lottery proceeds. These 
stadiums are usually publicly owned 
and leased to teams. A city derives rev-
enue from publicly built stadiums in a 
number of ways. Chief among them are 
rental payments made by teams; the 
local government’s share of parking, 
concessions, and luxury boxes; prop-
erty taxes on the stadium paid by the 
team; and rent received for nonsports 
activities, such as concerts. 
On the cost side, the city 
must account for depreciation and 
maintenance of the stadium, and the 
city’s share of the cost of providing 
utilities, refuse collection, and police, 
fire, and rescue services. In addition, 
municipalities must account for what 
economists call opportunity costs: lo-
cal governments’ spending on stadi-
ums lowers spending for other worthy 
projects or programs. For example, 
suppose the annual cost of a stadium 
in City A is $20 million a year for the 
next 30 years. If an entry-level teach-
er’s salary (including benefits) runs 
about $60,000 annually, one measure 
of the opportunity cost of the stadium 
is the 333 teachers that could have 
been added to the city’s school system. 
Indeed, to keep the Cincinnati Bengals 
from making good on a threat to move 
to Baltimore in 1995, local officials 
agreed to a $540 million deal for two 
new stadiums (one for the Reds, too). 
Although the action might not have 
been linked to the stadium-funding 
bill, The Economist noted that shortly 
before the vote on the stadium-funding 
bill, Cincinnati laid off 400 staff mem-
bers from its school district, including 
200 teachers.2  
In principle, cities could set 
rental payments to cover all the costs 
associated with constructing and oper-
ating municipal stadiums.  In practice, 
since all four major sports leagues 
exercise considerable control over the 
geographic mobility of established 
teams as well as over the creation of 
new franchises, cities do not set rental 
payments in this way. In the intense 
competition for teams, cities have 
offered favorable stadium deals in 
their efforts to retain or attract sports 
franchises. 
Numerous independent stud-
ies by economists have shown that any 
revenue cities receive typically fails 
to cover costs because of favorable 
clauses in the lease regarding rent; 
the teams’ share of parking, conces-
sions, and luxury boxes; and partial or 
full forgiveness of property taxes. For 
example, according to Michael Leeds 
and Peter von Allmen, the NFL’s 
Baltimore Ravens pay no rent, while 
MLB’s Chicago White Sox pay $1 a 
year for the use of New Comiskey Park. 
In examining 25 sports facilities built 
between 1978 and 1992, James Quirk 
and Rodney Fort calculated that the 
annual subsidy to professional sports 
teams averaged $9.2 million (or $12.3 
million in 2002 dollars). Even then, 
the annual subsidy is underestimated 
because data were not available for 
investments made to facilities subse-
quent to original construction. Quirk 
and Fort also estimated that the an-
nual subsidy jumps to $20 million ($29 
million in 2002 dollars) for the average 
stadium when investments subsequent 





The question becomes: 
Why do local governments provide 
2 “Footloose Football,” The Economist, 
September 9, 1995, p. 90.
3 John Siegfried and Andrew Zimbalist point 
out that the escalating costs of recent stadium 
construction suggest that the average subsidy 
has surely grown since 1992.
Economists have long 
studied the effects of an 
area’s quality of life on 
wages and the cost of 
housing. 8   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   9 www.phil.frb.org
Because of the difficulties in using “multiplier 
analysis” to assess the economic impact of 
professional sports teams, economists have 
used other sorts of calculations to study this 
impact. 
such large subsidies to professional 
sports teams? One justification for the 
subsidy has been that sports teams 
increase employment and income and 
promote growth of the local economy.  
Obviously, public investment in stadi-
ums can be beneficial, but how do we 
evaluate a new sports facility’s contri-
bution to local economic growth? 
To address this question, 
most proposals to use public funds for 
building stadiums are accompanied by 
an economic impact analysis. These 
studies attempt to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of a new stadium.
The costs and benefits fall 
into four broad categories: direct 
benefits, indirect benefits, construction 
costs, and operating expenses. Direct 
benefits stem from new spending that 
a team generates for the city.  This in-
cludes spending by fans in local restau-
rants and hotels and for souvenirs and 
spending by players and other team 
employees and the team’s spending for 
local goods and services.
These direct expenditures by 
teams, their employees, and their fans 
become income for other city resi-
dents, who then re-spend part of this 
income when purchasing other local 
goods and services.  This re-spend-
ing process, which continues through 
second, third, and subsequent rounds, 
is the indirect benefit. Since direct 
expenditures lead to indirect expendi-
tures, the direct expenditures are said 
to have a “multiplier” effect on the 
local economy. Thus, for example, if a 
dollar of direct spending resulted in an 
additional dollar of indirect spending 
in the local economy, total spending 
in the local area would be $2 and the 
multiplier’s value is 2.4  According to 
Joseph Bast, impact studies have used 
multipliers with values as high as 3.  
One potential shortcoming 
of impact studies is that they are often 
commissioned by proponents of the 
stadium projects, such as teams them-
selves, and conducted by accounting 
firms or local chambers of commerce. 
According to Noll and Zimbalist, the 
authors of impact studies tend to make 
very favorable assumptions about the 
income and number of jobs generated 
and how much of this income stays in 
the local economy. In addition, they 
may make unrealistic assumptions 
regarding construction and operat-
ing costs and fail to account for the 
opportunity cost of the funds tied up 
in these projects; therefore, the net 
benefits of stadium projects can be 
vastly overstated depending on the 
assumptions made. 
For example, in its analysis 
of the new stadium being built for the 
NFL’s Baltimore Ravens, the Maryland 
Department of Business and Economic 
Development estimated an annual 
economic benefit to the Baltimore 
metropolitan area of $111 million and 
the creation of almost 1400 new jobs. 
According to Leeds and von Allmen, 
independent analysis found a much 
smaller impact on annual income ($33 
million) and jobs (534). In general, 
independent studies by economists 
suggest that the value of local multipli-
ers is at most 1.25, less than one-half 
of the value suggested in some impact 
studies.
Because of the difficulties in 
using “multiplier analysis” to assess 
the economic impact of professional 
sports teams, economists have used 
other sorts of calculations to study this 
impact. These studies have attempted 
to measure the local impact of hosting 
a team using three different methods. 
First, some studies have compared the 
growth rates of income or employment 
in cities and metropolitan areas that 
have teams with growth rates of these 
variables in cities that do not have 
teams. For example, in a 1994 study, 
Robert Baade found no significant dif-
ference in per capita personal income 
growth during the period 1958 to 1987 
between metropolitan areas with major 
league sports teams and those without. 
Another way to measure 
teams’ impact on the local economy 
is to compare growth before and after 
the acquisition of a new major league 
team. In a 1997 study, Baade and 
Sanderson looked at the impact on 
employment and output in 10 metro-
politan statistical areas (MSAs) that 
had acquired new teams between 
1958 and 1993. They found that while 
certain sectors closely related to profes-
sional sports do show some employ-
ment gain, aggregate employment 
shows little impact from the existence 
of sports teams.  
A final way is to measure the 
impact of a specific team (such as the 
Baltimore Orioles) on economic devel-
opment in a specific location (Mary-
land).  For example, in a 1997 study 
Bruce Hamilton and Peter Kahn found 
that even at Camden Yards — widely 
believed to have been a good invest-
ment for Baltimore — public expen-
4 Jordan Rappaport and Chad Wilkerson 
provide summary details for a representative 
sample of recent stadium impact studies. 10   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   11 www.phil.frb.org
diture cannot be justified on grounds 
of local economic development.  They 
estimate that Maryland and its munici-
palities lose about $9 million annually 
on Camden Yards.5 They report that 
the stadium generates enough revenue 
to cover capital and maintenance 
costs, but under the conditions of the 
lease, the team’s owners keep most of 
this revenue.
Regardless of the method 
used by independent researchers, the 
bottom line is that subsidies to sports 
teams appear to be much greater than 
the economic benefits they generate 
for cities. Findings such as these led 
Siegfried and Zimbalist to conclude 
that “few fields of empirical research 
offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet, 
independent work on the economic 
impact of stadiums and arenas has 
uniformly found that there is no statis-
tically significant positive correlation 
between sports facility construction 
and economic development.” 
Moreover, economists have 
pointed out that local spending related 
to professional sporting events may 
result in less spending on other recre-
ational activities. While the attraction 
of a new team to a city or the con-
struction of a new stadium may lead 
to entirely new spending in the local 
economy, it’s more likely that much of 
the local spending by fans is redirected 
from activities occurring elsewhere in 
the local economy.  Since households 
have limited budgets for and time to 
spend on leisure activities, sporting 
events may merely shift the timing 
and location of spending within the 
metropolitan area but leave aggregate 
spending unchanged.6  
One exception would be if 
sports events attracted a large number 
of “out-of-town” fans, thus bringing 
new spending into the region. Accord-
ing to Noll and Zimbalist, these types 
of fans account for only 5 percent to 
20 percent of all fans attending major 
league sporting events.  Siegfried 
and Zimbalist point out that there is 
considerable evidence that out-of-state 
fans do not come to town because of 
regular season sporting events.  They 
are in town for other reasons, such as 
a business trip or a visit to family and 
friends. Thus, if they had not attended 
a regular season game, they would 
have spent money on other types of 
leisure activities the region has to offer.
These findings pose the ques-
tion: Is there an economic justifica-
tion for subsidizing professional sports 
teams in an era in which local gov-
ernments’ budgets are under intense 
pressure and given the sizable opportu-




The subsidies granted to pro-
fessional sports teams, in some sense, 
suggest that civic leaders and resi-
dents view professional sports teams 
as valued assets of a city. Frequently, 
civic leaders speak of the intangible 
benefits of hosting major league sports, 
such as civic pride. A typical statement 
expressing these sentiments comes 
from Philadelphia’s mayor, John Street: 
“We are incredibly fortunate to be 
the home of great professional sports 
franchises.  They enrich our commu-
nity, fortify our tax base, and provide 
major support for the region’s future 
economic growth. And then there are 
the intangible benefits: These Phillies 
[Philadelphia’s major league baseball 
team], if we give them our full support, 
will bring us together [and] solidify a 
sense of community with civic pride as 
they drive toward the pennant.”   
Similarly, economists have 
noted that professional sports teams 
contribute to the quality of life in an 
area by increasing the satisfaction or 
happiness of residents in general, not 
just those who attend games. As we 
noted earlier, it’s likely that many city 
residents get pleasure from the pres-
ence of local professional sports teams 
even when they neither attend games 
nor pay for sports programming on 
cable TV.  Mayor Street’s words speak 
to the “civic pride” that can result 
from a successful franchise. There-
fore, perhaps residents should think 
of a professional sports team in the 
way they think of a new art museum 
or new symphony hall or, indeed, an 
environmental resource such as an old-
growth forest: It’s a commodity from 
which they receive enjoyment just by 
having it around. 
The interest that professional 
sports franchises generate suggests 
they are far more important than these 
other public goods. In the controver-
5 According to Hamilton and Kahn, the cost to 
the Maryland Stadium Authority for operating 
the stadium is approximately $20 million 
annually ($14 million in real interest and 
depreciation and $6 million in maintenance).  
The Maryland Stadium Authority receives 
approximately $6 million in rent annually from 
the Orioles and another $5 million in admission 
tax revenue; therefore, it incurs a deficit of 
approximately $9 million per year.
6 The shift in spending may be meaningful to 
an area’s central city if sports fans who spend 
money because they are attending games would 
have patronized suburban establishments in the 
absence of a game.
The subsidies grant-
ed to professional 
sports teams, in some 
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sial words of Art Modell, owner of the 
Cleveland Browns-Baltimore Ravens 
franchise:7 “The pride and the pres-
ence of a professional football team is 
far more important than 30 libraries” 
[quoted in Leeds and von Allmen’s 
book].  
So teams create value for 
local residents that owners of sports 
franchises cannot capture.  That is, 
the team can’t charge a fan for just 
being a fan.  But that doesn’t make this 
“external benefit” any less real. If the 
value of these external benefits is large 
enough, they alone might justify the 
subsidies that local taxpayers grant to 
teams. But because no one is excluded 
from enjoying the external benefit 
generated by local sports team, it be-
comes difficult to know how much this 
matters to people, precisely because 
you can’t charge them for the privilege 
of being a fan. While these benefits 
are hard to measure in dollar terms, 
economists have made significant 
strides in quantifying the value resi-
dents place on similar types of quality-
of-life benefits, such as clean air, scenic 
views, nearness to the ocean, or good 
weather.  
Measuring the External 
Benefit.  The value of a city’s special 
traits, such as good weather or the 
existence of professional sports teams, 
is determined by what people are will-
ing to pay in order to live there. This 
amounts to the sum of what people are 
willing to pay for each local character-
istic that either adds to or reduces the 
quality of life in an area. The trick is 
to determine the prices of these local 
amenities, or traits, since they are not 
bought and sold in markets. 
Even though there is no 
explicit price for local amenities such 
as the presence of an NFL team, there 
is an implicit price. Suppose you are 
considering moving to either City A, 
which has an NFL team, or City B, 
which does not. Other than their NFL 
status, these cities are alike in all other 
aspects. Because the presence of an 
NFL team is something you value, you 
are willing to pay some extra amount, 
say, $1000, for having a team in your 
city. 
There are two ways in which 
you could pay your extra $1000. One 
is by bidding up land prices, and 
ultimately rents, in City A relative to 
City B. But it is not necessarily the 
case that you will ultimately pay $1000 
more to rent a house in City A. Part 
of the cost of living in a city with an 
NFL team could be paid in the form 
of lower wages than you would have 
accepted in City B. What must be true 
is that rent and wage differentials sum 
to $1000.  Thus, the extent to which 
land rent is higher and wages are lower 
is the extent to which the amenity 
value of an NFL team is capitalized 
into local land markets and local labor 
markets. Put differently, since NFL 
status is the only difference between 
the two cities, a household’s willing-
ness to pay the extra $1000 to live in 
City A must be due to the difference in 
NFL status.
Measuring the Amenity 
Value of the NFL. Economists have 
developed statistical techniques to 
measure the variation in rents and 
wages that are attributable to each of 
the local area’s traits, and economists 
have used these estimated implicit 
prices of amenities to rank areas ac-
cording to their attractiveness. In our 
2003 study, we argued that if people 
like having professional sports teams in 
their community, they are presumably 
willing to pay for it — if not directly 
through the purchase of season tickets, 
then indirectly through an increased 
willingness to pay for housing in the 
area and an increased willingness to 
accept marginally lower wages.  
Bruce Hamilton and Peter 
Kahn first broached the idea that dif-
ferentials in local wages and rents may 
provide a basis for valuing the social 
benefit of sports teams. They argued 
that while such differentials may exist, 
correlations between the presence of 
sports teams and wages and rents will 
surely be confounded by the correla-
tion between these variables and city 
size (and perhaps other city-specific 
characteristics).8 For example, be-
cause rents tend to increase with city 
size and large cities tend to host NFL 
teams, isolating the effects of an NFL 
team’s presence on rents may be dif-
ficult. 
In our study we confronted 
this issue in a number of ways.  We 
focused our attention on NFL football 
franchises in the 1990s, since there 
was movement and expansion of NFL 
teams in both moderate-size cities 
(Jacksonville, Nashville, and Char-
lotte) and exit of franchises in larger 
metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles 
and Houston, the nation’s second 
and fifth largest metropolitan areas, 
7 In validating the bonds to construct 
Raymond James Stadium in Tampa, home to 
the NFL Buccaneers, the Florida Supreme 
Court described the public benefits of stadium 
construction in Poe v. Hillsborough County. The 
court explained: “[T]he Court finds that the 
Buccaneers instill civic pride and camaraderie 
into the community and that the Buccaneer 
games and other stadium events also serve a 
commendable public purpose by enhancing 
the community image on a nationwide basis 
and providing recreation, entertainment and 
cultural activities to its citizens.”
Teams create value 
for local residents
that owners of sports 
franchises cannot 
capture.
8 See also the article by Rappaport and 
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respectively.  We assume that the 
movement and expansions will weaken 
the correlation between city size and 
NFL teams sufficiently to facilitate 
estimation of an NFL effect.  Still, only 
eight of the 32 cities had a change in 
their NFL status between 1993 and 
1999, the period of our study, making 
it hard to identify an NFL effect in 
local wages and rents. 
 In addition to looking at the 
recent movement to moderate-size 
cities, we focused our attention on 
NFL football franchises, for two more 
obvious reasons.  The first is the pre-
eminent attention the NFL receives 
among all sports in the United States.  
If any professional sport generates a 
measurable differential in wages and 
rents across cities, football is likely 
to be the one.  Moreover, the most 
serious rival for that attention, Major 
League Baseball, has had very little 
expansion in recent years and no fran-
chise movements since the early 1970s.  
The NFL, on the other hand, has had 
a bit more expansion and substantially 
more franchise movement.  
Perhaps more important, the 
location of NFL franchises probably 
has less to do with city-specific char-
acteristics, such as population size and 
growth, than in any other major sports 
league. Most of an NFL franchise’s 
revenue comes from an egalitarian 
split of the national TV contracts, and 
even locally generated stadium ticket 
revenue is split more equitably (60 per-
cent to the home team, 40 percent to 
the visiting team) than in other sports 
leagues.  In contrast, baseball team 
revenue is far more heavily weighted 
toward local sources, particularly local 
TV contracts. 
In our study, we estimated the 
change in rents and wages resulting 
from a change in NFL status between 
1993 and 1999.  We estimated two 
equations: one for wages and another 
for rents. We found that the presence 
of an NFL team raises annual rents, 
on average, 8 percent. We also found 
that wages were about 2 percent lower 
in cities that host an NFL team, but 
the differential was not statistically 
significant. Perhaps the demand for 
labor adjusts more rapidly than the 
supply of housing, and this more rapid 
adjustment tends to ameliorate the 
effect on wages. In addition, if the 
NFL amenity makes workers more 
productive, the demand for labor could 
also increase, and the effect on wages 
would be ambiguous.  In what follows, 
we will focus only on the rental 
premium.9
Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
Since the 53 cities in our sample had, 
in 1999, an average monthly rent of 
$500, the finding of an average rental 
premium of 8 percent implies an NFL 
amenity premium of about $40 a 
month per housing unit, or $480 annu-
ally, on average, in cities hosting NFL 
teams.  In 1999, there were approxi-
mately 290,000 households in a typical 
central city, so $480 per household 
implies that the aggregate amenity 
value to a city that hosts an NFL team 
is, on average, about $139 million per 
year (or about $184 per person).10  
How do the estimates of the 
amenity value of hosting an NFL team 
compare with the subsidies? Earlier 
we pointed out that James Quirk and 
Rodney Fort calculated that the annu-
al subsidy to professional sports teams, 
including investment subsequent to 
the original cost, averaged $20 million 
in 1989 dollars (or $27 million in 1999 
dollars).11 The annual quality-of-life 
benefit of $139 million found in our 
study is substantially larger than the 
annual subsidy, suggesting that these 
subsidies were good investments for 
the typical city. Our study showed that 
the quality-of-life benefit to households 
easily exceeds the subsidies granted 
in all cities that hosted an NFL team 
during the 1990s.
Cost-Revenue Analysis. 
While the finding that the aggregate 
value of the quality-of-life benefit may 
justify the subsidies is good news for 
city residents, public officials may be 
more concerned with the impact these 
subsidies have on local budgets. Our 
results suggest that team subsidies can 
also potentially pass the cost-revenue 
test. This means that if cities could ef-
fectively appropriate through taxation 
the rise in property values that resulted 
9 Our study uses regression analysis in which we 
relate the level of rents and the level of wages 
in a city in each of two years to whether the 
city had an NFL franchise in 1993 or 1999. 
We control for city-specific traits that did 
not change between 1993 and 1999, such as 
nearness to an ocean, and we controlled for 
a variety of city characteristics that did vary 
between the two years, such as city size, city 
population growth, the rate of crime, local 
fiscal variables, and so forth.  In addition, we 
also controlled for a large number of individual 
housing characteristics, such as number of 
rooms and age of the unit, and a random effect 
that controls for individual characteristics that 
do not vary over time. The implicit price of a 
professional sports franchise is measured by 
the coefficient of a dummy variable indicating 
the presence of an NFL franchise in the 
particular city and year. Given the existence 
of city-specific traits, the identification of this 
NFL effect comes from league expansion and 
franchise movements into and out of cities over 
the years between the two panel observations.  
As indicated in this article, eight of these cities 
had a change in NFL team status between 1993 
and 1999. Six cities (Baltimore, Charlotte, 
Jacksonville, Nashville, Oakland, and St. Louis) 
did not have an NFL franchise in 1993 but had 
gained one by 1999. Two cities (Houston and 
Los Angeles) hosted an NFL team in 1993, but 
not in 1999. Twenty-four cities hosted an NFL 
team in both 1993 and 1999.
10 The average central city in our sample had a 
population of 753,705 in 1999. According to the 
Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., there were 2.6 
people per household in 1999, suggesting there 
are almost 290,000 households in a typical 
central city.
11 Interestingly, in their 2000 study that 
examined the 1995 budgets for eight cities, 
Donald Alexander, William Kern, and Jon Neill 
found an annual stadium subsidy in the range 
of $22 million to $29 million, depending on the 
city under consideration.12   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   13 www.phil.frb.org
from the local team’s existence, any 
such subsidy has the potential to be 
self-financing.  This is because higher 
rents imply higher housing prices for 
cities that host NFL franchises. The 
higher property values will lead to in-
creased tax revenues for central cities 
when properties are reassessed.  
Consider our representative 
city once again.  In 1999, the median 
price of a house across the cities in our 
sample was $123,433. If 8 percent of 
this value reflects an NFL premium in 
these cities and if we use the aver-
age property tax rate of 1.75 percent, 
available for 50 of the 53 cities in our 
sample, that means the NFL premium 
yields property tax revenue of just 
under $173 per year per household.12  
This could potentially be worth about 
$50 million a year in tax revenue for 
our representative city with 290,000 
households if it hosted an NFL team. 
The potential increase in property 
tax revenue of $50 million associated 
with hosting an NFL team is almost 
twice as large as the $27 million an-
nual subsidy reported by Quirk and 
Fort, suggesting that, on average, 
these subsidies are good investments 
for cities. Those who benefit from 
the team in terms of higher property 
values would be paying for its subsidi-
zation.  If the city could not effectively 
design a property tax in this way, the 
stadium subsidies would come out of 
general funds. In that case, subsidies 
may crowd out other expenditures that 
may have even greater benefits. Thus, 
our results do not constitute a blanket 
endorsement for stadium subsidies.13 
We found that the potential increase 
in property tax revenue exceeds the 
known subsidies granted to NFL teams 
in 22 of the 25 cities that provided 
stadium subsidies (see Cost and Benefits 
to Individual Cities).14
Other Studies. While these 
estimates of the benefits may appear 
large, they are broadly consistent with 
estimates found in other studies that 
have quantified the benefits for various 
types of amenities. For example, Joseph 
Gyourko and Joseph Tracy found that 
the annual value for just one extra 
sunny day is $7 per year per household, 
and Glenn Blomquist, Mark Berger, 
and John Hoehn found an annual 
value of $12.15 Based on these studies, 
Jordan Rappaport and Chad Wilkerson 
estimated that a metropolitan area 
with 2 million people should be willing 
to pay between $14 million and $24 
million a year for just one additional 
sunny day. While direct comparisons 
are always difficult, Rappaport and 
Wilkerson’s numbers, along with ours, 
suggest that the addition of an NFL 
franchise makes up for a week or so of 
cloudy days.
In their study, Rappaport 
and Wilkerson also noted that cities’ 
aggressive bids to replace teams further 
supports the view that the external 
benefits associated with hosting an 
NFL team may exceed the cost of do-
ing so. They point out that of the six 
cities that have lost NFL teams since 
1980, “all but Los Angeles subsequent-
ly allocated considerably more public 
financing to attract a new NFL team 
than it would have cost to keep their 
old team.”  For example, voters in St. 
Louis approved $280 million in public 
funds to build a new football stadium 
after the Cardinals departed for Ari-
zona in 1987.  St. Louis voters declined 
to allocate $120 million toward a new 
stadium when the Cardinals were play-
ing in St. Louis. 
In February 2000, Bruce 
Johnson, Peter Groothuis, and John 
Whitehead conducted a survey of 
residents of the Pittsburgh metropoli-
tan area, asking them how much they 
would be willing to pay in higher taxes 
to keep the NHL Pittsburgh Penguins 
from leaving the city.16 The average 
response was $5.57 per household per 
year. Since there are almost 960,000 
households in the Pittsburgh metro 
area, Johnson and his co-authors 
report that this gives an aggregate 
quality-of-life value of almost $5.2 mil-
lion per year — a present value of $66 
million if we use an 8 percent interest 
rate and assume a stadium life of 30 
years.
According to Rappaport 
and Wilkerson, between 1994 and 
2000, the average public contribution 
to NBA/NHL sports arenas was $84 
million.  The quality-of-life-benefit of 
$66 million represents only about 80 
percent of the average subsidy. While 
the $5.2 million annual quality-of-life 
benefit associated with hosting the 
12 We were limited to 50 of the 53 cities in 
calculating the potential increase in property 
tax revenue, since the property tax rate was not 
available for three cities.  The median house 
price of $123,433 is based on the 50 cities for 
which property tax rates are available.
13 The cost-revenue analysis we have presented 
here is for an average, or representative, city. Of 
course, the costs and revenue associated with 
hosting an NFL team will differ widely across 
cities.  
14 The 8 percent increase in rents is an average 
effect across the 53 cities comprising our 
study.  In addition, we assume that the effect 
on rents is the same for cities that gain a team 
as for those that lose one.  In the long  run, the 
supply of housing may increase and rents and 
housing prices may go up by less than the initial 
increases.  Still, the greater number of housing 
units will lead to increased property tax revenue 
without the need to reassess housing values for 
tax purposes. 
15 The annual values are expressed in 1999 
dollars.
16 At the time of the survey there was some 
concern that the Penguins could not survive in 
Pittsburgh.  The Penguins declared bankruptcy 
in October 1998.  In addition, they continue to 
play in the oldest arena in professional hockey, 
and Pittsburgh is a relatively small market.14   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   15 www.phil.frb.org
Costs and Benefits to Individual Cities
T
he cost-benefit analysis reported in the 
text is for a representative, or average, 
city used in our 2003 study.  Obviously, 
the analysis will differ dramatically 
across cities.  Three things will affect 
the potential increase in property tax 
revenue for a given city: the increase in property values 
(actually in assessed property values), the number of 
housing units, and the property tax rate.  Obviously, 
property tax revenue will increase with all three vari-
ables. 
The table gives the present value of the po-
tential increase in property tax revenue, assuming that 
the median price of housing reflects either an 8 percent 
premium in cities that currently host an NFL team or a 
similar increase in housing values in cities that do not 
currently host a team. Recall that the 8 percent hous-
ing price premium is an average across cities, and this 
premium may be somewhat larger or somewhat smaller 
in any particular city. In addition, reassessment practices 
are not uniform across cities, and these conventions will 
also influence the potential increase in property tax rev-
enue that comes from hosting an NFL team.  The values 
shown in the second column of the table assume that the 
median house value in each city has been reassessed to 
reflect the 8 percent NFL premium.*   
The table shows the cities ranked in terms of 
the present value of the potential increase in property 
tax revenue, based on a 6 percent interest rate and a 
stadium life of 30 years. The present value of the poten-
tial increase in property tax revenue is largest in New 
York City: more than $12 billion. Second largest is Los 
Angeles, at $3.6 billion, underscoring the need to have 
an NFL team in the area. Among cities that host an NFL 
team, the present value of the potential increase in prop-
erty tax revenue is smallest in St. Louis: $140.6 million.  
The final column of the table shows all sources 
of public subsidies (state and local) provided to NFL 
teams for the construction of new stadiums in 1999 
dollars, obtained from the National Conference of State 
Legislators, in an April 1998 report called “Playing the 
Stadium Game.” The subsidy exceeds the present value 
of the potential increase in property tax revenue in 
only three of the 25 cities that provided subsidies (New 
Orleans, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis). In Cincinnati and 
Kansas City, the present value of the potential increase 
in property tax revenue is only somewhat larger than the 
subsidy. 
The escalating costs of recent stadium construc-
tion suggest that the average subsidy has surely grown 
over time, potentially putting more cities on the unfavor-
able side of the cost-revenue analysis. In the 1970s, cities 
contained stadium costs by building stadiums that were 
used for both baseball and football. Today, stadiums are 
dedicated to single use and include more costly features, 
such as luxury boxes and skyboxes. For example, Three 
Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh, which opened in Sep-
tember 1970, cost $159 million in current dollars and 
was home to both the NFL Steelers and the NL Pirates. 
Heinz Field, which opened in August 2001, cost $281mil-
lion and is home to the Steelers only. The Pirates play in 
PNC Park, which opened in the spring of 2001 and cost 
$216 million. Together these two parks cost almost $500 
million to construct, with state and local governments 
footing two-thirds of the cost.
In 1999, recognizing the increasing cost of 
stadiums, the state of Pennsylvania created the Redevel-
opment Assistance Fund to finance the four stadiums in 
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, as well as the Giant Center 
in Hershey and other sports and arts facilities. The state 
capped its contribution at no more than one-third of the 
costs. Despite the escalation in the cost of stadiums, our 
findings suggest that team subsidies can potentially pass 
the cost-revenue test for the vast majority of cities that 
provide these subsidies.
* For any given city, we assumed that an 8 percent increase in rents resulting from the NFL premium also leads to an 8 percent increase in housing 
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TABLE
Potential Cost and Benefit to Individual Cities for Hosting an NFL Team 
(millions of 1999 dollars)
   Value of the
   Potential Increase
  City  in Property Taxesa  Subsidiesb
Denver   305.6  6.9 
Cleveland  296.4   
Memphis  289.3   
New Orleans  280.3  414.3 
Minneapolis  263.0  117.7 
Las Vegas  259.1   
Cincinnati  227.0  198.7 
Sacramento  214.7   
Raleigh  200.4   
Fort Lauderdale  189.5   
Newark  179.6   
Oklahoma City  172.0   
Salt Lake City  167.8   
Rochester  161.6   
Kansas City  150.7  85.6 
Pittsburgh  148.3  149.8 
Tampa   145.8  30.0 
St. Louis  140.6  313.7 
Orlando  129.6 
San Antonio  120.6   
Greensboro  115.4   
Hartford  108.7 
Providence  106.0   
Grand Rapids  103.9   
West Palm Beach  55.6
    Value of the
    Potential Increase
  City  in Property Taxesa  Subsidiesb 
New York  12254.5  219.5c
Los Angeles  3629.3   
Chicago   3037.1  21.9 
San Francisco  2414.9  138.3 
Houston   1619.5  166.7 
San Jose   1326.2   
San Diego  1205.3  134.5 
Seattle    1107.6  330.8 
Dallas    990.0  143.9 
Philadelphia  867.0  205.5 
Detroit    804.8  172.4 
Austin    720.9   
Phoenix   670.7  5.7 
Boston    607.1  0.0 
Milwaukee  546.9   
Washington  501.5  105.7 
Jacksonville  475.7  132.8 
Columbus  474.1   
Baltimore  447.9  204.4 
Nashville-Davidson  446.7  319.2 
Atlanta    430.0  254.1 
Oakland   422.9  131.2d 
Miami    417.9  0.0 
Indianapolis  416.3  76.1 
Fort Worth  395.2 
a Based on  an estimated increase in property tax revenue resulting from an 8 percent increase in median housing price. The annual stream of 
property tax revenue is converted into present value terms using a 6 percent rate of discount and assuming a stadium life of 30 years.
b Source: National Conference  of State Legislators: www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/lfp106tb.htm. The source provided information only about 
subsidies for cities that had an NFL team in 1995. (Los Angeles and Cleveland did not have teams that year.)
c It’s not clear whether the money came from New Jersey or New York.
d The cost of the original stadium was $131.2 million. Currently, $127.0 million of renovations are under way.
Penguins seems small, the external 
benefit is likely to be much larger 
for other professional sports, such as 
football.  In the United States, hockey 
continues to have the smallest fan base 
of the four major league sports. Ac-
cording to Rappaport and Wilkerson, 
in 2001, nine of the 24 NHL teams (38 
percent) did not have local network 
television contracts. They also point 
out that ratings for televised NHL 
games are only half those of NBA 
games.   
The evidence provided in our 
study combined with the high valu-16   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   17 www.phil.frb.org
17 To see if our findings hold up under scrutiny, 
we performed a variety of tests. For example, 
we controlled for the presence or absence of 
museums, another recreational amenity, and 
found that this variable was not statistically 
significant, regardless of whether the NFL 
variable was included in or excluded from the 
regression.  We also found an 8 percent rental 
premium associated with NFL status, regardless 
of whether city population size was included in 
or excluded from the regressions.  In addition, 
baseball added two teams during our sample 
period (one in Phoenix and one in Tampa Bay) 
that started playing in 1998. After controlling 
for the addition of these new teams, we found 
the quality-of-life premium associated with 
hosting an NFL team fell slightly below the 8 
percent effect on rents reported in this article. 
The decline, however, does not appreciably 
affect the findings and conclusions reported 
here. B R
ation placed on other quality-of-life 
characteristics found in other stud-
ies and the increased willingness to 
expand public funding for new NFL 
stadiums, even after a city has lost a 
team, substantially demonstrates that 
the quality-of-life benefits associated 
with hosting an NFL team may justify 
the seemingly large public expendi-
tures.
Still, assessing the benefits 
and costs associated with sports teams 
is a complex problem. Despite our 
careful attempt to control for the many 
local factors that could affect rents, 
it’s possible that our estimate of the 
implicit value of an NFL amenity is 
overstated because we failed to control 
for some factor that is positively cor-
related with both the presence of an 
NFL team and rents.  If our estimate of 
the implicit price of an NFL amenity is 
overstated, our estimate of the benefits 
used in the cost-benefit analysis is 
overstated.17 On the cost side, while 
the dollar amount to build a stadium is 
known, the opportunity cost of funds 
may be harder to estimate. 
CONCLUSION
Public officials and civic 
boosters are often criticized for en-
couraging the provision of subsidies 
to sports franchises. But if the subsi-
dization we discuss in this article is 
so politically unpopular, it is doubtful 
that officials would be so much in favor 
of it. But as we have argued, the debate 
over public subsidies to stadiums has 
focused on job and income creation 
in the cities in which the facilities are 
built. Although on that score stadium 
subsidies appear to be a bad idea, the 
range of potential effects goes beyond 
those involving income and job cre-
ation. While large public expenditures 
on the construction of new sports 
stadiums are, and will continue to 
be, controversial, our findings suggest 
that sports are popular, and once the 
quality-of-life benefits are included in 
the calculus, public spending on new 
stadiums may be a good investment for 
central cities and their residents.  This, 
of course, is not the same thing as 
recommending that cities immediately 
decide to fund stadiums if only because 
the opportunity cost of appropriating 
such funds is the elimination of other, 
possibly more worthy programs, such as 
building new schools.16   Q2  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q2  2004   17 www.phil.frb.org
REF  ER  ENC  ES
Alexander, Donald, William Kern, and Jon 
Neill. “Valuing the Consumption Benefits 
from Professional Sports Franchises,” 
Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 2000, pp. 
321-37.
Baade, Robert A. “”Stadiums, Professional 
Sports, and Economic Development: 
Assessing the Reality,” The Heartland 
Institute, Heartland Policy Studies 62, 
1994.
Baade, Robert A., and Allen Sanderson. 
“The Employment Effect of Teams and 
Sports Facilities,” in Roger Noll and 
Andrew Zimbalist, eds., Sports, Jobs 
and Taxes. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1997, pp. 92-118.
Bast, Joseph L. “Sports Stadium Madness: 
Why It Started, How to Stop It,” The 
Heartland Institute, Heartland Policy 
Studies No. 85, February 1998.
Blomquist, Glen, Mark Berger, and John 
Hoehn. “New Estimates of the Quality of 
Life in Urban Areas,” American Economic 
Review, 78, 1988, pp. 89-107.
Campbell, Harrison S. “Professional Sports 
and Urban Development: A Brief Review 
of Issues and Studies,” Review of Regional 
Studies, 29, 1999, pp. 272-92.
Carlino, Gerald A., and N. Edward 
Coulson. “Compensating Differentials and 
the Social Benefits of the NFL,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working 
Paper 02-12/R, June 2003 (forthcoming in 
Journal of Urban Economics).
Gyourko, Joseph, and Joseph Tracy. “The 
Structure of Local Public Finance and 
the Quality of Life,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 99, 1991, pp. 774-806.
Hamilton, Bruce W., and Peter Kahn. 
“Baltimore’s Camden Yards Ballpark,” in 
Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, eds., 
Sports, Jobs and Taxes. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997, pp. 
245-81.
Johnson, Bruce, Peter Groothuis, and John 
Whitehead. “The Value of Public Goods 
Generated by a Major League Sports 
Team: The CVM Approach,” Journal of 
Sports Economics, 2, 2001, pp. 6-21.
Keating, Raymond. “Sports Park: The 
Costly Relationship Between Major League 
Sports and Government,” Policy Analysis 
No. 339, The Cato Institute, 1999. 
Leeds, Michael, and Peter von Allmen. 
The Economics of Sports. Boston: Addison 
Wesley Publishers, 2002.
Noll, Roger, and Andrew Zimbalist. 
Sports, Jobs and Taxes. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
Quirk, James, and Rodney Fort. Pay Dirt: 
The Business of Professional Team Sports. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992.
Rappaport, Jordan, and Chad Wilkerson 
“What Are the Benefits of Hosting a 
Major League Sports Franchise?” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic 
Review, First Quarter 2001, pp. 55-86.
Rosentraub, Mark S. Major League Losers: 
The Real Cost of Sports and Who’s Paying for 
It. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Siegfried, John, and Andrew Zimbalist. 
“The Economics of Sports Facilities and 
Their Communities,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14, Summer 2000, pp. 95-114.
Street, John. “Go, Phillies,” Weekly Radio 
Address, August 18, 2001.